Eurogroup-ul a refuzat sa aprobe un nou program de salvare pentru Grecia, care a intrat in faliment, cu consecinte greu de prevazut; FMI a confirmat ca Grecia nu a platit transa de 1,6 miliarde euro, cerand o amanare
Autor: Bancherul.ro
2015-06-30 23:11
Ministrii tarilor din zona euro (Eurogroup) au respins in aceasta seara cererea de ultima ora a Greciei de i se aproba un nou program de salvare, cancelarul german Angela Merkel refuzand orice noi negocieri inainte de referendumul de duminica, 5 iulie, ceea ce inseamna ca Grecia a intrat in faliment, intrucat nu si-a platit o datorie de 1,6 miliarde de euro catre FMI, termenul expirand marti, consecintele fiind greu de prevazut.
FMI a confirmat ca Grecia nu a achitat transa de 1,6 miliarde de euro si faptul ca guvernul a solicitat o amanare de ultima ora a platii acesteia, pe care FMI urmeaza sa o analizeze.
Conform procedurii, Christine Lagarde, sefa FMI, va raporta conducerii fondului ca Grecia este “in intarziere” cu platile, jargonul pentru faliment.
Este pentru prima data in istoria FMI cand un stat cu o economie dezvoltata nu-si achita o datorie la timp, ceea ce s-a mai intamplat doar cu tari din lumea a treia, precum Zimbabwe, Sudan si Cuba.
Eurogroup-ul a anuntat ca a programat o noua teleconferinta pentru miercuri dimineata, la ora 9,30 GMT, pentru a discuta situatia Greciei, in timp ce oficialii acestei tari spun ca au cerut FMI amanarea platii transei de imprumut care are scadenta astazi, cu scopul evitarii intrarii tarii in faliment.
"Nu vom negocia absolut nimic inainte de referendumul programat in Grecia", a declarat Merkel, la Berlin, in timp ce la Atena zeci de mii de persoane manifestau in favoarea aprobarii la referendum a planului de reforme propus de creditorii Greciei, pentru evitarea iesirii tarii din zona euro, dupa ce aseara au manifestat cei care sustineau guvernul Tsipras pentru respingerea acordului cu troika.
Germania este cel mai mare creditor al Greciei, bancile germane detinand o cota importanta din obligatiunile grecesti emise in anii precedenti.
In aceasta situatie, nu mai exista nicio sansa pentru a se evita ca Grecia sa intre in faliment la mijlocul noptii, intrucat tara nu poate achita o rata de 1,6 miliarde de euro catre FMI, odata ce acordul cu troika (UE, FMI si BCE) expira astazi.
Grecia a solicitat astazi autoritatilor europene un nou program de salvare pe o perioada de doi ani, insotit de restructurarea datoriilor, cu cateva ore inainte de expirarea precedentului program si a neputintei guvernului de a efectua o plata de 1,6 miliarde de euro in contul FMI, a anuntat oficial guvernul de la Atena. (vezi aici detalii)
In scrisoarea de o pagina semnata de Tsipras, guvernul grec nu s-a angajat insa sa faca vreo concesie fata de cerintele finantatorilor privind implementarea unor reforme economice, ca o conditie pentru primirea banilor necesari pentru a se evita intrarea tarii in faliment.
Consecintele neachitarii transei de 1,6 miliarde de euro catre FMI
Grecia a primit aproape 240 de miliarde de euro in cadrul a doua programe de salvare a tarii (bailouts) de la Uniunea Europeana si FMI incepand cu 2010.
Daca guvernul grec nu ramburseaza o transa de 1,6 miliarde euro catre FMI, care are scadenta astazi, seful institutiei, Christine Lagarde, va raporta conducerii fondului ca Grecia este “in intarziere” cu platile, jargonul pentru faliment.
Consecintele falimentului sunt greu de prevazut, mai ales ca incepand de ieri Grecia a impus restrictii de capital pentru evitarea intrarii bancilor in colaps financiar, retragerile de la ATM-uri fiind limitate la 60 de euro zilnic iar transferurile de fonduri sau platile in afara tarii fiind interzise.
Vicepremierul elen Ioannis Dragasakis a afirmat marți la postul național de televiziune ERT că Grecia a cerut Fondului Monetar Internațional (FMI) amânarea rambursării de peste 1,5 miliarde de euro care trebuie plătită până la orele 22.00 GMT, scrie AFP.
"Am depus la FMI o cerere astfel încât să ia inițiativa de a amâna plata pentru luna noiembrie", a declarat Ioannis Dragasakis, situație ce ar permite Greciei să evite intrarea în faliment în legătură cu datoria sa față de instituția de la Washington, precum și agravarea unei situații financiare deja critice.
Comentarii
IMF recunoaste ...GRECIA - faliment
Even its own officials recognize that the IMF played a leading role in Greece’s economic collapse. It’s time for the Fund to own up and pay its dues. Tonight is the deadline for Greece to transfer a 1.6 billion euro debt repayment to the IMF. The country’s Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has announced that his government cannot pay — and so it won’t. At 6pm Washington-time, 1am locally, Greece will officially default on the IMF. It will be an unprecedented event in the history of finance: never before has a developed country fallen into arrears on a loan from the Fund. Unsurprisingly, the international press is already conjuring up unflattering comparisons with notorious failed states like Zimbabwe and Somalia, which are among the few countries to have gone down the same path of utter financial ignominy. With all due respect for Zimbabwe and Somalia, the implication of this media narrative is clear: Greece is about to become a hopeless basket case. In truth, superficial parallels like these are dangerously misleading. Not only do they compare apples and oranges; they also end up obscuring the IMF’s own role in the decimation of the Greek economy, which basically made an eventual 2 Greek default inevitable. By uncritically reproducing narratives of Greece’s “failure” to repay the Fund, many in the international media are directly overlooking the fierce internal criticism that top IMF officials have expressed about their own responsibility for the utter disaster of the Troika’s bailout programs. Yes, it’s true: never before has a developed country failed to repay the IMF on time. But, then again, never before has a developed country experienced such a catastrophic economic collapse in peacetime — and never before have official creditors been so criminally complicit in producing the collapse (although the brutal structural adjustment programs in Latin America, Africa and East-Asia were in many ways even more inhumane). Greece has by now lost a quarter of its total economic output since the start of the crisis. Unemployment is still higher than it was in the United States during the Great Depression. Public health and other public services have completely imploded. Almost 1 million Greeks are without health insurance; 11.000 people are estimated to have committed suicide as a result of economic hardship. The depth of this crisis is absolutely unprecedented, and the creditors themselves (including the IMF) owe a great deal of the responsibility. Interestingly, the IMF itself has long since recognized this. Just consider what the Fund wrote in its ex-post evaluation of the first Greek bailout of 2010. The program, the IMF blatantly states, “only served to delay debt restructuring and allowed many private creditors to escape … leaving taxpayers and the official sector on the hook” (p. 28). Moreover, the Fund admits that “earlier debt restructuring could have eased the burden of adjustment on Greece and contributed to a less dramatic contraction in output” (p. 33). In the same report, the IMF also conceded that “the burden of adjustment was not shared evenly across society” (p. 24); that “ownership of the program was limited” (p. 24); that “the program was based on a number of ambitious assumptions” (p. 26); that “the risks were explicitly flagged” (p.27); and that “ex-ante debt restructuring was not attempted” (p. 27). “An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece,” the Fund concludes, “although this was not acceptable to the euro partners. A delayed debt restructuring … provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands.” Or to put that in ordinary language: the IMF basically admits that it should have canceled a large chunk of Greece’s debt at the very start, but decided not to do so because the Europeans needed them to help save their private banks. There you have it, from the horse’s mouth. Miranda Xafa, a former member on the IMF executive board, has reached the same conclusion. Noting that the reason for delaying a much-needed debt 3 restructuring was simply to allow private banks to reduce their exposure to Greece, she penned a highly critical paper in which she confirms that “The exposure of core euro area banks, especially French and German banks, was a key reason why a debt restructuring was not attempted sooner.” By early 2011 it was already clear that the first bailout would not be enough to keep Greece afloat. Unsurprisingly, given the ferocity of the austerity measures demanded by the IMF and the European creditors, the Greek economy was contracting much faster than the wildly optimistic IMF prognoses had foreseen (see the graph below). In a widely disseminated mea culpa , IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard later acknowledged that the Fund’s unrealistic (and ultimately false) prognoses hinged on a set of assumptions that massively underestimated the contractionary effects of the Troika’s austerity measures. This was no mere methodological error. According to Susan Schadler, former deputy director of the IMF’s European Department, the Fund’s notoriously inadequate multipliers were the direct outcome of a set of “fundamental political pressures” that compelled IMF staff to paint a much rosier picture of the Greek bailout program than reality merited. The Fund’s scheme was obvious for everyone to see. As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times noted: “instead of making the debt sustainable, the programme merely let many private creditors escape unscathed. All this tells us depressing things about the politicisation of the IMF and the inability of the eurozone to act in the best interests of its weaker members.” Even its own officials recognize that the IMF played a leading role in Greece’s economic collapse. It’s time for the Fund to own up and pay its dues. Tonight is the deadline for Greece to transfer a 1.6 billion euro debt repayment to the IMF. The country’s Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis has announced that his government cannot pay — and so it won’t. At 6pm Washington-time, 1am locally, Greece will officially default on the IMF. It will be an unprecedented event in the history of finance: never before has a developed country fallen into arrears on a loan from the Fund. Unsurprisingly, the international press is already conjuring up unflattering comparisons with notorious failed states like Zimbabwe and Somalia, which are among the few countries to have gone down the same path of utter financial ignominy. With all due respect for Zimbabwe and Somalia, the implication of this media narrative is clear: Greece is about to become a hopeless basket case. In truth, superficial parallels like these are dangerously misleading. Not only do they compare apples and oranges; they also end up obscuring the IMF’s own role in the decimation of the Greek economy, which basically made an eventual 2 Greek default inevitable. By uncritically reproducing narratives of Greece’s “failure” to repay the Fund, many in the international media are directly overlooking the fierce internal criticism that top IMF officials have expressed about their own responsibility for the utter disaster of the Troika’s bailout programs. Yes, it’s true: never before has a developed country failed to repay the IMF on time. But, then again, never before has a developed country experienced such a catastrophic economic collapse in peacetime — and never before have official creditors been so criminally complicit in producing the collapse (although the brutal structural adjustment programs in Latin America, Africa and East-Asia were in many ways even more inhumane). Greece has by now lost a quarter of its total economic output since the start of the crisis. Unemployment is still higher than it was in the United States during the Great Depression. Public health and other public services have completely imploded. Almost 1 million Greeks are without health insurance; 11.000 people are estimated to have committed suicide as a result of economic hardship. The depth of this crisis is absolutely unprecedented, and the creditors themselves (including the IMF) owe a great deal of the responsibility. Interestingly, the IMF itself has long since recognized this. Just consider what the Fund wrote in its ex-post evaluation of the first Greek bailout of 2010. The program, the IMF blatantly states, “only served to delay debt restructuring and allowed many private creditors to escape … leaving taxpayers and the official sector on the hook” (p. 28). Moreover, the Fund admits that “earlier debt restructuring could have eased the burden of adjustment on Greece and contributed to a less dramatic contraction in output” (p. 33). In the same report, the IMF also conceded that “the burden of adjustment was not shared evenly across society” (p. 24); that “ownership of the program was limited” (p. 24); that “the program was based on a number of ambitious assumptions” (p. 26); that “the risks were explicitly flagged” (p.27); and that “ex-ante debt restructuring was not attempted” (p. 27). “An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece,” the Fund concludes, “although this was not acceptable to the euro partners. A delayed debt restructuring … provided a window for private creditors to reduce exposures and shift debt into official hands.” Or to put that in ordinary language: the IMF basically admits that it should have canceled a large chunk of Greece’s debt at the very start, but decided not to do so because the Europeans needed them to help save their private banks. There you have it, from the horse’s mouth. Miranda Xafa, a former member on the IMF executive board, has reached the same conclusion. Noting that the reason for delaying a much-needed debt 3 restructuring was simply to allow private banks to reduce their exposure to Greece, she penned a highly critical paper in which she confirms that “The exposure of core euro area banks, especially French and German banks, was a key reason why a debt restructuring was not attempted sooner.” By early 2011 it was already clear that the first bailout would not be enough to keep Greece afloat. Unsurprisingly, given the ferocity of the austerity measures demanded by the IMF and the European creditors, the Greek economy was contracting much faster than the wildly optimistic IMF prognoses had foreseen (see the graph below). In a widely disseminated mea culpa , IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard later acknowledged that the Fund’s unrealistic (and ultimately false) prognoses hinged on a set of assumptions that massively underestimated the contractionary effects of the Troika’s austerity measures. This was no mere methodological error. According to Susan Schadler, former deputy director of the IMF’s European Department, the Fund’s notoriously inadequate multipliers were the direct outcome of a set of “fundamental political pressures” that compelled IMF staff to paint a much rosier picture of the Greek bailout program than reality merited. The Fund’s scheme was obvious for everyone to see. As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times noted: “instead of making the debt sustainable, the programme merely let many private creditors escape unscathed. All this tells us depressing things about the politicisation of the IMF and the inability of the eurozone to act in the best interests of its weaker members.” Log In Sign Up The IMF defaulted on Greece a long time ago Jerome Roos Uploaded by Jerome Roos 4 Info Download PDF Paper load 1 The IMF defaulted on Greece a long time ago Jerome Roos , published in ROAR Magazine , June 30, 2015. Available at:
DSK
Former IMF Chief Proposes Temporary Suspension
Former International Monetary Fund Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn made his own suggestions about the Greek financial crisis urging Greece’s international lenders to accept a temporary halt to debt payments. The former French finance minister presented his proposals to the public through a three-page declaration entitled “On learning from one’s mistakes” that he posted on his Twitter account on Saturday. In Strauss-Kahn’s text, one can read the following: “Greece should get no more new financing from the EU or the IMF but it should get a generous maturity extension and significant NOMINAL DEBT Roeduction from the official sector.” The former IMF chief believes that providing additional assistance to Athens to simply repay its international creditors is simply inane. “The government would have to start collecting taxes and confronting the oligarchy, the vested interests and the deep state that are sapping its formidable potential,” Dominique Strauss-Kahn claims. And he continues by writing: “If this proves successful, Greece should then become eligible for gradual nominal debt write downs.” - See more at: http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/06/29/former-imf-chief-proposes-temporary-suspension-of-greek-payments/#sthash.zIQMV3Ka.dpuf
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Noutati FMI
- FMI: criza COVID-19 se transforma in criza economica si financiara in 2020, suntem pregatiti cu 1 trilion (o mie de miliarde) de dolari, pentru a ajuta tarile in dificultate; prioritatea sunt ajutoarele financiare pentru familiile si firmele vulnerabile
- FMI cere BNR sa intareasca politica monetara iar Guvernului sa modifice legea pensiilor
- FMI: majorarea salariilor din sectorul public si legea pensiilor ar trebui reevaluate
- IMF statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission to Romania
- Jaewoo Lee, new IMF mission chief for Romania and Bulgaria
Noutati BERD
- Creditele neperformante (npl) - statistici BERD
- BERD este ingrijorata de investigatia autoritatilor din Republica Moldova la Victoria Bank, subsidiara Bancii Transilvania
- BERD dezvaluie cat a platit pe actiunile Piraeus Bank
- ING Bank si BERD finanteaza parcul logistic CTPark Bucharest
- EBRD hails Moldova banking breakthrough
Noutati Federal Reserve
- Federal Reserve anunta noi masuri extinse pentru combaterea crizei COVID-19, care produce pagube "imense" in Statele Unite si in lume
- Federal Reserve urca dobanda la 2,25%
- Federal Reserve decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 1-1/2 to 1-3/4 percent
- Federal Reserve majoreaza dobanda de referinta pentru dolar la 1,5% - 1,75%
- Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement
Noutati BEI
- BEI a redus cu 31% sprijinul acordat Romaniei in 2018
- Romania implements SME Initiative: EUR 580 m for Romanian businesses
- European Investment Bank (EIB) is lending EUR 20 million to Agricover Credit IFN
Mobile banking
- Comisioanele BRD pentru MyBRD Mobile, MyBRD Net, My BRD SMS
- Termeni si conditii contractuale ale serviciului You BRD
- Recomandari de securitate ale BRD pentru utilizatorii de internet/mobile banking
- CEC Bank - Ghid utilizare token sub forma de card bancar
- Cinci banci permit platile cu telefonul mobil prin Google Pay
Noutati Comisia Europeana
- Avertismentul Comitetului European pentru risc sistemic (CERS) privind vulnerabilitățile din sistemul financiar al Uniunii
- Cele mai mici preturi din Europa sunt in Romania
- State aid: Commission refers Romania to Court for failure to recover illegal aid worth up to €92 million
- Comisia Europeana publica raportul privind progresele inregistrate de Romania in cadrul mecanismului de cooperare si de verificare (MCV)
- Infringements: Commission refers Greece, Ireland and Romania to the Court of Justice for not implementing anti-money laundering rules
Noutati BVB
- BET AeRO, primul indice pentru piata AeRO, la BVB
- Laptaria cu Caimac s-a listat pe piata AeRO a BVB
- Banca Transilvania plateste un dividend brut pe actiune de 0,17 lei din profitul pe 2018
- Obligatiunile Bancii Transilvania se tranzactioneaza la Bursa de Valori Bucuresti
- Obligatiunile Good Pople SA (FRU21) au debutat pe piata AeRO
Institutul National de Statistica
- Deficitul balanței comerciale la 9 luni, cu 15% mai mare față de aceeași perioadă a anului trecut
- Producția industrială, în scădere semnificativă
- Pensia reală, în creștere cu 8,7% pe luna august 2024
- Avansul PIB pe T1 2024, majorat la +0,5%
- Industria prelucrătoare a trecut pe plus în aprilie 2024
Informatii utile asigurari
- Data de la care FGA face plati pentru asigurarile RCA Euroins: 17 mai 2023
- Asigurarea împotriva dezastrelor, valabilă și in caz de faliment
- Asiguratii nu au nevoie de documente de confirmare a cutremurului
- Cum functioneaza o asigurare de viata Metropolitan pentru un credit la Banca Transilvania?
- Care sunt documente necesare pentru dosarul de dauna la Cardif?
ING Bank
- La ING se vor putea face plati instant din decembrie 2022
- Cum evitam tentativele de frauda online?
- Clientii ING Bank trebuie sa-si actualizeze aplicatia Home Bank pana in 20 martie
- Obligatiunile Rockcastle, cel mai mare proprietar de centre comerciale din Europa Centrala si de Est, intermediata de ING Bank
- ING Bank transforma departamentul de responsabilitate sociala intr-unul de sustenabilitate
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