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## **CEE BANKING: THE NEW “NORMAL”**

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## CEE Banking study 2012: main findings

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- The long-term outlook for regional convergence remains intact, but economic growth will likely be structurally lower on average and growth differentials within the region (much) wider than in the past.
  - We still see potential for the CEE banking sector to generate above-EU average growth in banking volumes and profitability, as the penetration gap still exists, but there remain large divergences among segments and countries.
  - In the new environment, a more balanced funding structure should clearly prevail, particularly in countries featuring high funding gaps.
  - 2012 should remain a challenging year for CEE banking, with regulatory changes and European debt crisis as main risk factors. Western European banks' deleveraging remains however a manageable drag although some countries are more exposed than others.
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
## Agenda

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
- **CEE Macro: testing times**
- CEE Banking: the new 'normal'

# Eurozone woes increase the CEE risk, although the region shows good resilience

## Consumer confidence indicator (1)



## Sovereign credit risk premia




- CEE is not in the eye of the storm ...
- ... but financial woes in EMU have led to a widening of risk premia also for CEE countries
- Confidence indicators point to a slowdown, but less alarming than in 2008


(1) CEE including only EU member states  
 SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis, Bloomberg, EU Commission

# Differentiation of growth performance also likely to persist in 2012

## 2012 GDP growth (real % yoy)



## Trade<sup>(1)</sup> (% of GDP, 2010)





- Some countries remain more exposed through the trade channel to external shocks
- SEE and some CE economies should experience greater moderation in headline figures
- Poland, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey ought to show a better performance

(1) Trade: Export + Import

SOURCE: UniCredit Research, Yapi Kredi Research, World Bank

# Convergence, but not at breakneck speed and driven by tradable sectors

Catch-up potential remains in place, but pace should be differentiated



- Decent catch-up potential underpinned by improving productivity and convergence of income levels is expected over the medium term
- Long-term vision for regional convergence remains in place but should be pursued through broader economic diversification and increasing role of tradable sectors

(1) Countries in grey refer to other emerging economies in CEE and Central Asia.

(2) CEE aggregate including CZ, BG, HU, PL, RO, RU, SK, UA and TK

SOURCE: IMF WEO, Global Insight, UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis


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
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# Lending activity restarted in most of CEE. Russia and Turkey emerge as clear outperformers

Total Loans, YTD % growth (Nov-2011)



Loan-to-deposits ratio, %




SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis



# Rising evidence of decoupling between credit growth and the economic cycle

CEE-12 lending activity and economic growth (delta volumes in EUR bn) <sup>(1)</sup>



- **Creditless recoveries are not a rare event. One out of four recoveries in output occurs without a pick-up in lending activity**
- **Weaknesses in credit growth appear to be the result of both demand and supply factors**


<sup>(1)</sup> CEE-12 includes EU members + Croatia and Turkey

<sup>(2)</sup> Correlation between lending and economic growth


SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

# How far could lending fall short?

Estimated prob of a creditless recovery



Contributions to estimated prob by sub-regions




## Probabilities of creditless recoveries during the next years remain largely heterogeneous within CEE

- Demand factors contribute to increase probability of creditless recovery by 56pps in Latvia, 41pps in Estonia, 33pps in Ukraine, 27bps in Lithuania and 9pps in Slovenia
- Supply factors become crucial in countries hit by large banking shocks and/or experiencing a significant deleveraging process (increasing probability of a creditless recovery by about 28pps in Latvia and Ukraine and 15pps in Kazakhstan and Slovenia)

SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

# Top foreign owners from Western Europe account for 30% of CEE <sup>(1)</sup> banking assets


**Bank assets <sup>(2)</sup> in CEE (EUR bn, end of 2010)**



<sup>(1)</sup> EU10 member states + Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine  
<sup>(2)</sup> Split between domestic and foreign owners is based on the main shareholder (sometimes less than 50% stake)  
<sup>(3)</sup> Top CEE players from Western Europe + some other WE players with strong presence in specific CEE countries  
<sup>(4)</sup> Remaining WE players (with negligible share in CEE) + other foreign players (e.g. from US)  
 SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

# EMU banks' deleveraging: country risk scores remain rather low


## Western European banking deleveraging risk index for CEE countries



<sup>(1)</sup> The index is a weighted (with a share in a country's total bank assets) average of bank owners' ranks. The ranks vary from 0 (no risk) to 5 (high risk). 0 = domestic owners; 1 = non-WE foreign owners and WE owners with small (<5%) potential need to deleverage or CEE subsidiary fully self-funded; 2 = WE owners with potential need to deleverage by 5-10%; 3 = WE owners with potential need to deleverage by 10-15%; 4 = WE owners with potential need to deleverage by 15-20%; 5 = WE owners with potential need to deleverage by more than 20%.

# The overall impact of potential Western European banks deleveraging on lending activity ought to remain limited

2011-2015 total loans growth (% LC CAGR)




(1) Moderate” exposure - countries with the mid-term deleveraging propensity index above 1.5. “Low” exposure – countries with the mid-term deleveraging propensity index between 1 and 1.5; “none” exposure – countries with the mid-term deleveraging propensity index below 1.0

(2) Under the deleveraging scenario, forecasts incorporate only the direct impact of parent bank problems due to capital shortages


SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

# Under the new normal, a more balanced funding structure should prevail. A further effort to boost the domestic debt market remains crucial to foster lending activity in the region

Loan-to-deposits ratio, %



Bond issuance in CEE (2008-11, € mn) <sup>(1)</sup>




- We foresee deposits and other local funding as likely increasing their significance in banks' total liabilities with a further contraction in the share of external liabilities
- Given the short-term nature of deposits, the development of local currency long-term funding remains crucial

<sup>(1)</sup> Figures for 2011 refer to YTD issuance until Oct 2011 and include covered bonds, guaranteed bonds, senior unsecured and subordinated  
 SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis, Bloomberg

# Cost of funding remains a key variable to monitor


## Global banking and CEE regional risks <sup>(1)</sup> (5Y CDS, bp)




(1) International banks in CEE include UCG, ERSTE, KBC, SOCGEN and INTESA; EU large banking groups include BARCLAYS, RBS, HSBC, BBVA, DB  
 SOURCE: UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis

# In some countries, credit quality problems might reoccur

**NPL ratio by sub-regions (% of gross loans)**



**Effect of NPL write-down on CEE banks' CAR**



- **NPLs should further normalize although with mixed trend across countries**
- **Despite good capital adequacy ratios in the region, still high NPLs represent a potential source of risk**
- **Fast NPL resolution would be desirable but can prove to be harmful for banks' financial stability**

(1) For Romania and Czech Republic informally required target 10%

(2) For Ukraine, simulation based on official NPL statistics; using unofficial estimates on the NPL ratio, the impact would be more severe with CAR turning negative

SOURCE: Local Central Banks, UniCredit CEE Strategic Analysis